

In choosing the color of disks and therefore the color-lead at the beginning of a match (Part 123), the choice is sometimes controlled by the question as to who will have the last-shot of the first half-round, or the two initial last-shots in doubles.

THE VALUE of the last-shot is so great that, in the long run, most of the scores are made concurrently with the possession of the last-shots.

A shuffler who has the last-shot should expect to score, and should average about four points per half-round in which he has the last-shot, depending upon his skill.

Observation and recording of the play of 13 experts in tournament matches shows that for 649 half-rounds of play the average amount by which the score of the shuffler having the last-shot exceeded the score of his opponent was about four points (actually 4.26).

This is the average for the entire score per half-round, and is

differentiated from the figure of 6.3 shown in Parts 14 and 104 and mentioned above, which latter figure applies only to the last-shot with the board clear.

If the player having the last-shot fails to make more than his opponent, he suffers a lost opportunity valued at about four points.

In the articles on Playing to the Score (Parts 129-132) and the later articles on Selection (Parts 136-153), the decisive value of the last-shot stands out strongly.

In short, the value of the last-shot is basic.

A TOURNAMENT EXAMPLE in which the last-shot dominated was shown in Figure 244 of Part 125, and the reader was invited to select a solution. The last-shot play actually made is shown in Figure 268.

DOUBLES. In the doubles game, each team has two last-shots in succession, to be followed by two last-shots by their

opponents. The successive last-shots are worth an average of four points each, or eight points for the pair, depending upon the skills of the shufflers, but the pair has a possible value that may be much higher.

Such a lead of eight points over the opponents who are about to have their two last-shots is not a considerable lead, since it should be balanced almost at once, but a lead of eight points over opponents who have just finished their two last-shots is a considerable lead and should be stretched to a lead of about 16 points with the two last-shots about to be played.

Toward the end of the game, the pair of successive last-shots attains great importance, either in finishing the game or in saving the game.




Figure 268

PART 136: TACTICS, SELECTION (A)

Some basic problems in selection, not complicated, are seen in the following examples.

CALCULATE, SELECT. In the 1954 Full Moon Doubles Tournament at Lakeland, Paul Lennox and Henry Andringa were playing against Don Owens and Farrell Bruner, all four being experts. The score was 66 to 69, respectively.

At the last-shot of a frame, to be played by Red, the situation was as shown in Figure 269. Black had two scoring disks at H and F, for 15 points, which would bring the total score of the Blacks to 81 if undisturbed.

If Owens (1) spoiled both black disks with a combination, he could not score for his side, because the hit at an angle against H would cause the shooting disk to glance to the right and out of scoring area. The score would remain 66 to 69.

But he needed six points to reach game score and also needed to spoil at least one of the opponent's disks in order to win.

While he could (2) spoil disk

H, he could not use it as a back stop for scoring, and the opponent would gain 7 for the half-round, to make the score 73 to 69.

But Red could (3) spoil disk H by a glancing hit to knock it to the right and at the same time glance to the left side of the court for a score of 8, as described in Part 19. The score would become 74 to 77. This would be practicable and would win the game, but it was not as sure a shot as the next choice.

Finally he could (4) shoot directly at F to score against it, to spoil it, and perhaps to put it in the kitchen. The score would become 74 to 76, and perhaps 64 to 76.

He selected this fourth choice, the most logical, easiest and surest, and he accomplished it fully. Gain for the shot: 24 points. Score for the frame: Black -2, Red 7. Over-all score: 64 to 76, and the game was won.

SIMPLE CALCULATION was involved in another situation, shown in Figure 270. The shooter




Figure 269

Figure 270

Figure 271

Red, Leslie Vincent, a former national champion, was about to play the last-shot.

Since the opponent's 8 at F would bring the latter's score to

76 points, it was necessary either to spoil F or to make a simple score. F could be spoiled,

perhaps by a combination, perhaps by a thin direct hit, but

neither of these appeared attractive.

However, calculation showed that it was necessary only to

make a simple score, an 8 or a 7, in order to win. So Vincent shot for and made an 8, to make the score 76 to 78, with Red winning.

WHAT PLAY would you make in the situation shown in Figure 271? It occurred in one of the matches of the 1957 Yuletide

Tournament.

Red was about to play the last-shot. What did he do? And what was the resulting score? The answer will be shown in Part 137.

PART 137: TACTICS, SELECTION (B)

An interesting and valuable type of shot, as used in tournament play by Gerald Anderson, a top-level shuffler, is shown in Figures 272 and 273.

GENTLY ON LINE. In Figure 272 the shooter Red had a scoring disk B, and there was also an enemy disk F-1, snuggled about a foot from B, edge to edge, so as to make it difficult to spoil F-1 without also spoiling B (Part 107).

Anderson played a delicate shot (Figure 273) to tap F-1 gently onto the center line at F-2, at the same time backstopping the shooting disk at point C.

This left both B and C on the board in scoring positions. It had the great additional advantage that disk F-2 lay partly between B and C, in such a position that it would have been difficult for the opponent to knock C against B in order to spoil them, for F-2 was in the way.

FORESEE OPPONENT'S play. In one of the matches of the 1956 State Gold Medal Tournament, Amy Close was playing against another expert, with score at 40 to 71, Figure 274. Amy was to play the seventh shot.

The opponent Black had two scoring disks, G and F, for 17

points, while Red had a single disk at C for a 10. There were also two non-scoring disks A and B, one on each side of the point of the triangle.

The black disk F had good though not perfect protection by the disk B. The other black disk G was well protected against a shot by Red, partly by being snuggled against C, which would be spoiled if G were hit with a full hit, and partly because the disks A and B would prevent or hamper any shots to hit G at an angle.

If the situation were left as it lay, the next shot of the opponent would probably be to shoot against G in order to spoil C. A very gentle shot to score another 10 against G, and to move G slightly so as to put C on the line, while a delicate and difficult shot, would be very remunerative for Black, as it would give Black 27 points for the frame and save the game. Or a faster and surer shot would put C out of scoring area.

While Red could (1) shoot for a simple score on the right side of the court, it appeared far more important (2) to prevent Black from making one of the above-described shots against G and C.




Figure 272

Figure 273

Figure 274

Accordingly, Close played a guard to X, at the point of the triangle. This shot accomplished its purpose, and Black did not then succeed in ruining Red's score.

THE ANSWER to the problem shown in Figure 271 of Part

136 is that the shooter Red wisely avoided the complicated situation on the right of the board, played for a simple score on the open left side of the board, and made an 8. The over-all score in the game then became: Black 53, Red 80, with Red winning.

PART 138: TACTICS, SELECTION (C)

In the quarterfinals of the 1954 State Gold Medal Tournament, Amy Close, who was five times Florida State champion, was playing against Janet Smith, 1952 national open singles champion.

Amy Close had already won one game, and the score was 71 to 71 in the second game.

STUDY CAREFULLY. The situation, shot by shot, developed as follows, with Black to have the last-shot.

With her first shot, Red placed a cross-guard at A, Figure 275. Black then played to knock away disk A and missed. This was an important failure, and it gave Red an opportunity that might have been decisive.

Red promptly grasped the opportunity and hid a disk at B for an 8. Black then attempted a combination to spoil disks A and B, but succeeded only in knocking away disk A, which Red then replaced by another disk at the

same spot. Black repeated the attempt with the same result, and Red again replaced.

This brought up Black's last-shot. Black had three choices, and failure in any one of them would lose the game and tie the match at one game apiece. She could (1) try again for the combination, with about one chance in three of success, at about a five-foot distance.

Or she could (2) shoot for an 8 on the open side of the board,

to tie the score at 79 to 79 and necessitate one more full round to decide the tie. The probability of success of this shot was about 80 per cent, or about four chances in five.

Or finally she could (3) play to score a 10, to win the game at 79 to 81, with the chances of making this shot being perhaps 50-50.

Amy Close shot carefully for a 10, made it, and won the game and match.

COMPLEX SHOT. In an infor-

mal game, the situation was as shown in Figure 276. The score was not critical. The shooter Red was about to play the sixth shot of a frame.

He had several choices. He could (1) drive B-1 against E-1 in a combination to spoil E-1 and perhaps to score B-1, and perhaps put E-1 in the kitchen.

Or he could (2) shoot for a simple score on the open right side of the board. This would have invited a kitchen shot against it at once.

Another possibility was (3) to

play a glancing hit against B-1 in order to score a 10.

However, he was ambitious and he selected a still different shot (4) to play a double from the diagonal line against B-1 (Part 46), hoping also that his disk B-1 would be knocked against E-1 to spoil it.

His shooting disk hit B-1, Figure 277, and glanced to right for a 10 at C. B-1 was knocked diagonally to the left to hit E-1, and then stopped for a score of 8 at B-2. Finally E-1 was tapped into the kitchen at E-2.

Gain for the shot: 36 points.




Figure 275 Figure 276 Figure 277

PART 139: TACTICS, SELECTION (D)

At the final shot of the State Gold Medal Tournament March 9, 1956, a well-remembered play occurred.

Freda McLauchlin and Bill Folberth had won their way to the finals match by defeating the best in the tournament.

CLOSE MATCH. Between these two it was a long and evenly fought match. Freda had won the first game 75 to 72, and Bill had won the second 68 to 81. They were approaching the end of the third game, with the score at 69 for Freda and 68 for Bill. Bill was to have the last-shot.

At the seventh shot of the half-round, with no scoring disks on the board, Freda shot for a high 10, but made a low 10 at D, Figure 278 (H being not yet on the board).

The obvious shot was then for Bill to use Freda's disk for a backstop to score a 10, at the same time knocking her disk out of the 10 - area, preferably onto the center line. Even if her disk were to score an 8, Bill would win if he were to score a 10. Still he could not be entirely certain of scoring a 10, since his shooting disk might possibly glance to one side and stop on a line.

Bill used excellent judgment and shot his disk straight for Freda's 10, a gentle shot to score a 10 and spoil the black disk.

However, he shot just a little too gently, for his shooting disk stopped a couple of inches short of the target.

So they both scored 10s, with the over-all score going to 79 for Freda to 78 for Bill. Thus Freda won the game and match and tournament and the big gold medal, by one point.

AN INTERESTING PLAY occurred earlier in the same match. The situation was as shown in Figure 279. Folberth, playing Black, had a 7 at F, which was well protected by the black disks E and H.

McLauchlin had a red disk C-1 just barely on the 7-8 cross-line and not extending into the 8-area at all. The score was at 39 all.

Several possible choices were open to Freda at her last-shot.

She could (1) play a combination to spoil F by knocking H or E against it. But at a distance of about seven feet the chances of hitting F were about one in three (Part 86). In other words, there were two chances to one of missing.

Another choice would be (2) to try to carom from C against F, not an easy shot.

The most usual shot would be (3) to play for a simple score on the left side of the board. This would afford excellent chances of placing an 8 or a 7, making




Figure 278 Figure 279 Figure 280

the score about even for the frame. In playing this, the shooting disk might well be aimed directly toward the liner at C-1, so that if the shooting disk were to go too far, it might well hit C-1 and cause it to score a 7.

Another possibility would be (4) to shoot at the edge of C-1 and try for a right-and-left double on the cross-line, as described in part 47. This shot is played rarely because it requires very delicate and accurate shooting.

However even if the shot were to fail to make a double, it might result in a score by one or the other of the two disks.

Freda accomplished the double as in Figure 280. Her shooting disk gently tapped C-1 on the side and glanced onward into the 7-area for a score at D, while C-1 was moved diagonally onward to C-2 for another score.

Gain for the shot: 14 points. Score for the frame: Black 7, Red 14. Resulting score in the game: Black 46, Red 53.

PART 140: TACTICS, SELECTION (E)

A variation from the situations shown in Part 132 occurred in the

1957 Orlando Doubles Tournament, in which the Mirror Lake

team of Mae Hall and Bess Henderson was playing in the finals

against the Orlando team of Pat Hill and Louise Amrhein, all four

being top-level experts.

The Orlando team had won the first game and the Mirror Lake team had a 26-point lead in the second game with the score 48 to 74.

The situation was as shown in Figure 281. Black had just placed a good high 10 at H. No other disk was on the board except a non-scoring disk at B.

SPOILED HIGH 10. This seemed to be one of those cases in which the shooter would ignore the high 10 and shoot for a simple score to make the one point needed to win the game. We do not know why Mae did not do so.

However, probably one of the principal reasons was the fact the last-shot in the next half-round would be played by her partner, Bess Henderson, in whom she could have high confidence. Also the shot to spoil H was very sure. And the chances were that the opponent in the next half-round would not also make a high 10.

Mae knocked away the black 10, leaving no score for the half-round.

Then her partner scored 17 points in the next frame to win the game at 48 to 91.

UNUSUAL PLAY. In the 1954 Gasparilla Tournament, the shooter Black, Donald Dewart was playing against Henry Badum, both being top-level shufflers. The score was 47 to 6 in favor of Black at the seventh shot of a frame, with the situation as shown in Figure 282, as he was about to play the seventh shot.

The opponent Red had two scoring disks B and C on the board. No other disks were on the board.

The shooter had several choices, but little chance of preventing the opponent from making a definite gain for the frame.

He could (1) knock away disk C and score an 8, which in turn would surely be played for the kitchen, with a possible gain for the opponent of as much as 25 points for the frame.

Or he could (2) play a combination to spoil C and B. This is the shot that most shufflers would probably play in this situation, and would be a sound selection. The shooting disk would probably glance to one side, but might remain on the board to become a possible target for a kitchen shot.

Or Black could (3) shoot directly at B and use it as a backstop to score a 7, which would then be reasonably protected by disk C. Also there was a good opportunity to put B in the kitchen.

Even if Black made only a 7, it would still be some advance toward the game score of 75.

The shooter Black selected the third choice, an unusual shot, made a 7 and spoiled B, with a gain of 14 points for the shot.

COLOR AND SIDE. The reader may have wondered why practically all diagrams have shown Red as the shooter and also as playing constantly on the right. This has been done as a simplification and as a convenience to the reader, as it has been believed that the diagrams would be easier to understand than if there were frequent changes from right to left and from Red to Black.

The procedure has simply been to transpose the sides and col-




Figure 281 Figure 282 Figure 283

ors where it has appeared desirable. Accordingly the diagrams do not necessarily show which color or side a player actually used.

The foregoing case is an exception, the shooter is shown as Black on the left, in order not to conflict with another situation, previously shown, from the same tournament match.

NOT STICK IN KITCHEN. In a 1954 tournament match between Esther Kinsella, three times Florida State champion, the shooter Red, and Emma Leising, a skillful shuffler, the situation was as shown in Figure 283, with the score 62 to 72. Red was about to play the last-shot.

She could (1) clear away her kitchen disk C, which was deep

in the kitchen, so that there was a risk that the shooting disk might stick in the kitchen.

Or, as discussed in Part 81, she might (2) avoid the risk of sticking in the kitchen by shooting for a simple score, with chances of about four to one of making it.

The effect on the score would be essentially the same, and the choice depended primarily on the question as to which shot appeared to the shooter to be surer.

Esther evidently concluded that the shot for simple score would be surer. She played for an 8 and made it. Although she lost two points for the frame, her score was still no lower than 70, within one stroke of winning the game.

PART 141: TACTICS, SELECTION (F)

In the final match of the National Tower Tournament, at Lake Wales, Jan. 19, 1955, Webster H. Smith, the shooter Red, with his wife and partner Janet Smith, was playing against Carl Spillman, with his partner Henry Badum, all four being former national champions.

With the score at 77 to 88 in favor of the Smiths, and 100 points required to win the game, Smitty saw, at the fourth shot of a frame, the situation shown in Figure 284 (less disk B). He had a 7 on the board at A, while his opponent had an 8 at F. Each player was to have two more shots with Smith to have the last-shot.

The usual and natural action for Red in most such cases would have been (1) to spoil the black disk F, probably scoring against it as a backstop, and also perhaps putting it in the kitchen.

However, with the Reds' lead in score and nearness to winning, it was more important to increase the Reds' score and to approach the winning score of 100. In fact, if Smith could preserve his 7, which was already in being, he could also hope to make a score with his last-shot and thus win the game. This last-shot might also give him a later and deferred chance to spoil disk F.

He accordingly placed a guard

B to protect his disk A. Spillman, the opponent Black, was then forced to try to spoil A. He shot to do so with a combination to knock B against A, but succeeded only in spoiling the guard B.

Smith replaced the guard, and Spillman again played the combination, with the same result. This brought up Smith's last-shot, with the board as shown in Figure 284 (less disk B).

Smith's action to protect his disk A had thus brought him the opportunity to play for a simple score or for a backstop shot for a 7 or 8 to win the game. However, his shot for simple score did not succeed, and the score

became 85 to 95.

CONTRAST. In another part of the same match the score was 75 to 92.

Spillman, with his team 17 points behind, had at the first shot played kitchen-bait to E, Figure 285, for it was urgent to kitchen the opponent in order to cut down the opposing score and save the game. Smith left this bait in place.

At the time of the sixth shot, the situation was as shown in Figure 285, and Spillman was to play.

It was quite apparent that Smith would want to hide a disk beyond and under cover of disk

C. An 8 in that position would win the game for the Smiths.

While Spillman could (1) protect his scoring disk E, this would do him little good if Web made an 8 to win the game, and furthermore that disk E was still useful as kitchen-bait and should not be covered up.

So it was apparent that he should prevent a shot to hide beyond C. This could be done by (2) clearing away C, as mentioned in Part 34, or (3) by filling-in as described in Part 36. In view of the locations of disks B and E, an angle hit to clear C might cause C to hit B or E depending upon the angle used, right or left, and might leave B or C in scoring position, perhaps spoiling E.

The filling-in shot appeared to be surer, and would accomplish the purpose. Spillman played this

shot. His shot stopped at X. Then Red could hardly expect to score without Black being able, with his last-shot, to spoil his action.

This contrasts with the preceding case, where the action was to guard a scoring disk, but in this case not to do so.

Without going into further detail, it may be mentioned that the match was eventually won by the Sunshine team of Spillman and Badum, coming from behind.

DESPERATION. In the 1955 Yuletide Tournament, the shooter Red was on a spot, as shown in Figure 286. He could not spoil H because to hit it would merely drive it against A and C to leave it on the board to score the winning points. Yet he saved the game with his last-shot, which he was about to play. How? The answer will be described in Part 142.




Figure 284

Figure 285

Figure 286

PART 142: TACTICS, SELECTION (G)

In a match several times referred to in these articles, the quarterfinal match between Amy Close and Janet Smith in the 1954 State Gold Medal Tournament, the score at one moment was: Black 61, Red 70.

The situation was as shown in Figure 287, with three red disks A, C and B, and one black disk E. The only scoring disk was the red B in the kitchen.

Black was about to play the sixth shot of the frame.

Since the opponent Red was within five points of the game score of 75, it was especially important to the shooter Black to prevent the opponent from having an opportunity of spoiling the kitchen disk B. The shooter also wanted to score, if practicable.

The opponent Red's potentialities included knocking B from the kitchen, doubling on C, hiding beyond A, and hitting the next black disk to be played so as to spoil it, dunk it, or score against it. None of these potentialities was pleasant, and it would be desirable to prevent as many of them as possible.

POSSIBLE PLAYS. The shooter thought a long time. She could (1) knock away C to prevent the double, but this probably would expose the precious kitchen disk to be knocked away.

Or she could (2) put a guard at X to protect C, and this would also add to the protection of the kitchen disk B, and should prevent the double, but it would not prevent hiding beyond disk A.

She could (3) fill - in beside A, and this would prevent hiding beyond A, but it would leave open the shot for the double on C, which might win the game for Red.

Finally she could (4) place her disk in the 10-area, preferably as a high 10 at Z. This would force the opponent to shoot at it, it would partially block the opponent's shooting line to hide beyond A, it would hamper or prevent the double with C, and would double-guard the kitchen disk B.

The shooter Black played a 10, and her disk stopped at Y. The opponent then knocked it away, but did not succeed in scoring. Then Amy, with her last-shot, scored a simple 8, making the overall-score 69 to 60, advancing her to within one score of game, and withdrawing Red from that same nearness to game.

As mentioned above, Amy Close thought long before making her play, and it appears probable that she considered all of the possibilities mentioned above. She is outstanding for her deliberation and excellent judgment in selecting her shots.

KITCHEN BACKSTOP. In the




Figure 287

Figure 288

Figure 289

1954 Full Moon Doubles Tournament, Gerald Anderson, at his sixth shot of a frame, faced the situation shown in Figure 288.

With the big lead held by Anderson and his partner, the opponent Black wanted to put red disks in the kitchen. And he would not want to make a direct shot to knock his own disk G out of the kitchen in view of the formidable triple backstop formed

of black disks at the kitchen.

Neither would Jerry want his own disk to be knocked at that backstop. So he wasted his sixth shot far to the side, at C.

Nevertheless the opponent tried to knock it at the kitchen backstop, but he happened to fail in that shot.

WHAT CHOICES? A tournament situation is shown in Figure 289. The score was not criti-

cal, being about even, and it was early in the game. The shooter Red was to play the seventh shot.

Possible choices are outlined in Parts 41, 65 and 87, but without consulting those parts you are invited to make your own choice.

THE ANSWER to the problem posed in Figure 286 of Part 141 is that the shooter Red played to put in the kitchen the disk F that

was off to the side and out of scoring area. To his own surprise and that of his opponent he succeeded, and saved the game for the moment.

PART 143: TACTICS, SELECTION (H)

It was a contest between two of our best women shufflers, the shooter Red and Mae Hall, the opponent Black, with several national and state championships divided between them.

They each had a game in one of the quarterfinal matches of the 1957 State Gold Medal Tournament. They were nearing the end of the third and deciding game, and Mae had a lead of 13 points, the score being: Black 69, Red 56.

The situation was as shown in Figure 290. Red had a 7 at C-1, while there were two black disks F-1 and G at the right edge of the scoring diagram, one of which was on the line.

DIFFICULT SITUATION. Red was about to play the seventh shot, and the situation was very difficult.

If she (1) protected her 7 at C-1 by placing a guard at about point X, Black would have the greater part of the board open for a simple score, with about four chances to one of accomplishing it and winning the game and match.

If Red did not protect C-1, Black would be expected to use it as a backstop for a score of 7, with about a 10 to 1 chance of winning the game.

If Red (2) played for a high 10, the chances of making a high 10 were slight, about one in six, and even if the disk were well placed, Black could well ignore it and still shoot for a winning score against C-1.

Could Red (3) save the game by means of a kitchen shot? If

she could put F-1 in the kitchen, Black might knock it away and Red would save her 7 at C-1, and, more important, she would save the game for the moment. Then, in the next frame, Red would have the last-shot and perhaps be able to catch up in the game. Or, if Red were to put F-1 in the kitchen, Black might shoot to score against C-1 and put it in the kitchen, to lose only three points herself and to make the score 66 to 46.

So Red used good judgment and played to put F-1 in the kitchen, but it was no easy shot and she did not succeed in making it, knocking F-1 to F-2, Figure 291.

Then Black played her last-shot. Using C-1 as a backstop, she made her winning score of 7 at point D, incidentally putting C-1 into the kitchen at C-2.

This brought the over-all score to: Black 76, Red 46, and Mae Hall had won the match.

HAD TO DO IT. In one of the matches of the 1956 Florida State Closed Singles Championship, John Routh of Hollywood, the shooter Red, faced the situation shown in Figure 292.

The score was 66 to 68 in his favor, and it was his last-shot. But his opponent had just made a double for 17 points and had three scoring disks on the board at G, E and H, for a total of 24 prospective points which might bring his over-all score to 90 points.

If Red (1) succeeded in spoiling H and G with a combination, he could hardly hope to score in the 10-area on account of the an-




Figure 290

Figure 291

Figure 292

gle required for the shot, which angle would probably send the shooting disk off to the right side and out of scoring area. The score would then become 73 to 68 and the game would be saved, but the opponent would have the last-shot for the next frame. Also the chances of spoiling both disks H and G were not high.

With E under partial protection of F, the chances were even poorer for success of (2) a combination to spoil H and E.

If (3) he shot against H for a 10, and put H gently on the center line, a success with the shot would bring the score to 81 to 78

against him, and Black would win.

After some study, he remarked that his only chance was (4) to put H in the kitchen. He played for this shot and made 10-on and 10-off, to gain 30 points for the shot.

The score became 70 to 78, and he won the game.

THE ANSWER to the problem presented in Figure 289 of Part 142 was that the shooter played his seventh shot to hide partially in the 10-area. Then, fortunately for him, his opponent missed the disk.

PART 144: TACTICS, SELECTION (I)

In the quarterfinals of the 1957 State Gold Medal Tournament at St. Petersburg, Gerald Anderson, the shooter Red, was playing against Alton Vale, the opponent Black.

Vale was far behind in the score, which was 16 to 63, but he had been farther behind at 0 to

65. He had been climbing up to the existing score, and was later to climb as far as 40 to 63, using kitchen play to do so.

The situation was as shown in Figure 293. Vale had an 8 at G, while Anderson had a disk C in the kitchen, with a non-scoring disk at A.

CHOICES. In most situations like this, the most suitable play would be (1) to play the combination to spoil G and knock it against C to spoil the latter and perhaps to leave G in the kitchen.

Another play might be (2) to spoil G by a direct hit, backstopping against it for a score

and perhaps putting it in the kitchen.

But in view of the score, the important thing to Red was to maintain his own score of 63 intact and near to the winning score of 75. Since the opponent's score was so low, there was little advantage in hurting it further.

Therefore Jerry played (3) a direct shot to clear C from the kitchen, and succeeded.

SEVENTH-SHOT HIDING. In the 1954 Fun 'n Sun Doubles Tournament at Clearwater, Amy Close and her partner had a lead of about 20 points in the score and was near to the winning game score.

The situation was as shown in Figure 294 (less disk D). Only two disks were on the board, the black kitchen disk F and the liner at E. Close, the shooter Red, was about to play the seventh shot.

Her opponent Black had been playing the kitchen to save game, and it appeared probable that any disk Red put on the board would if practicable be played to the kitchen. Under this condition Red would hesitate to (1) protect the black kitchen disk by a guard at X.

She could (2) waste the shot, but did not want to do so.

Finally she could (3) try to hide in the limited area beyond disk E, a difficult shot, but barely practicable.

After some consideration, she played the last choice and her disk stopped at D, about one-fourth hidden by E, but sufficiently protected to prevent a kitchen shot.

The opponent then tried for the very long carom to glance from D against F, and succeeded in spoiling D but left F in the kitchen.

It is thus apparent that the partially hidden disk D protected the kitchen disk F in effect, by inviting the opponent to act otherwise than to shoot directly at F.

A VARIANT of the preceding situation is shown in Figure 295, in a play taken from the semifinals of the 1957 Yuletide Tournament.

After Carl Spillman had played disk H at the seventh shot so that it was partly hidden beyond G, Henry Andringa, with his commanding lead, wisely avoided shooting at H, against which he could not reasonably count on scoring, and from which he might glance into the kitchen.

He played the last-shot for a




Figure 293 Figure 294 Figure 295

simple score at Y.

Even though he abandoned the possibility of spoiling the opponent's score, the scores of both

contestants were raised, and it gave him the great advantage of reaching 74 points, within one score of winning.

PART 145: TACTICS, SELECTION (J)

In one of the quarterfinal matches of the Sunshine Skyway Tournament in 1954, Webster Smith, the shooter Red, was playing against Henry Andringa, the opponent Black, both former national champions.

The situation was as shown in Figure 296, with the two black disks G-1 and H in contact in the 8-area, and with Smith about to play his last-shot. The score was 64 to 73.

If the two disks were left in place they would give the opponent a score of 80 points, perhaps to win the game, whereas if one were left in place the opponent would have 72 points, with his last-shot to come up in the next frame.

The most obvious shot was (1) to shoot to knock away both disks. To do this in accordance with the studies of disks in contact (Parts 61 to 64), disk H should be hit to the right or left of a point S lying in extension of the line of centers of the pair of disks. The hit should preferably be to the right of S, as there was more room on the disk to make the hit on that side.

This hit would drive G-1 away in extension of the line of centers, and H would be squeezed out to the side. The speed should be enough to insure that H would be pushed out of scoring area.

A good choice would be (2) to play the shooting disk directly at the center of H in order that it should backstop against H for a score. The speed should be enough to send G-1 beyond the scoring area, but kitchen speed would not be ruled out.

If the shooter thus made an 8 with his shooting disk he would have a total score of 81, and it would make no difference what happened to the other disks, because the most that the opponent could score was 80 points.

Smith played to use disk H as a backstop, with approximately kitchen speed. The shooting disk D stopped for an 8, glancing slightly to the left. H was left in place. G-1 was driven to the edge of the kitchen at G-2.

Gain for the shot: 16 points. Score for the half-round: 8 to 8. Smith thus won the game at 72 to 81.

A STUDY is presented in Fig-




Figure 296 Figure 297 Figure 298

ure 298, in a situation which occurred in the 1957 State Gold Medal Tournament. Black is the shooter and is to play the seventh shot. She has at least three choices.

You are invited to figure them out and to select the best play to make. Her selection of the shot to make will be described in Part 146.

PART 146: TACTICS, SELECTION (K)

The basic tactical plan outlined in Part 124 indicates that when a shuffler is ahead or about even in the score and is to have the last-shot, he should keep the board clear and expect to score with the last-shot.

However, as mentioned in Part 100, it occurs from time to time that a shuffler is unfortunately diverted from the most suitable line of action, especially when an opportunity arises, even though not a good one, to put the opponent in the kitchen.

Also, it happens occasionally that a player becomes over-confident and even goes so far as to play kitchen-bait when he is ahead, with the expectation that he will gain a double-disk score at a time when he should be clearing the board and expecting to make a single-disk score with his last-shot.

Something like the last-mentioned case appears to have happened in the following case.




Figure 299

Figure 300

Figure 301

Figure 302

UNDUE RISK. In one of the late matches of the 1955 Champion of Champions Tournament, an expert shuffler, the shooter Red, was playing against Mark Brashares, the 1954 Florida State open singles champion. The score was 7 to 16 in favor of Red.

At the sixth shot, to be played by the shooter Red, the situation was as shown in Figure 299 (less disk C-1), with only disk E on the board.

The proper line of action for Red was to clear the board. Most experts would make this play, and probably the shooter would ordinarily do so.

However, he played instead for the open side of the board, apparently for kitchen-bait, his disk stopping at C-1 on the 7-8 cross line.

The opponent, who was nine points behind in the score, saw an opportunity to gain by kitchening the shooter, and promptly played to put C-1 in the kitchen at C-2, Figure 300, at the same time backstopping his shooting

disk at H for an 8.

The situation then led Red to use his last-shot to play the combination to knock H against C-2 in order to spoil both, and perhaps to leave the black disk H in the kitchen. The combination, at a distance of a little over four feet, center-to-center, had a probability of about 50-50, or one chance in two, that the first disk H would hit the second disk C-2.

But the combination failed, H was knocked away and the shooter Red scored an 8. The score for the half-round was therefore minus two for the shooter Red, whereas it should have been up to the average of four points per half-round (Part 135).

Red had taken an undue risk and had lost. His chances of gaining by means of clearing the board and making a simple score were better than the course he took.

It is true that the kitchen-bait sequence often attains greater

gains, but the chances of doing so are less than the chances by clearing and scoring. Those players who use the kitchen-bait sequence do so because they are obliged to use it, not because they want to do so. They have recourse to it because they are behind in the score and must utilize it or else submit to the opponent's maintaining his lead.

CHOICE. In one of the quarterfinal matches of the 1957 State Gold Medal Tournament, the situation was as shown in Figure 301, with three disks on the board at C, F and G. Red was about to play the seventh shot.

Because of Red's great lead in score, Black would want especially to put the red disk C in the kitchen, so that Red would want to protect C. But also Red would not like to abandon to Black the opportunity of making a triple on the center line with disks G, F and the black shoot-

ing disk.

Red therefore played to point D-1 in scoring area, the disk D-1 furnishing some protection to disk C (Figures 301 and 302).

The two red scoring disks D-1 and C then forced Black to try to spoil them. Black accordingly played a combination to knock D-1 against C.

The result was as shown in Figure 302. One of the red disks was spoiled, but the other remained on the board for a 7 at D-2.

The score for the half-round was: Black 8, Red 7, and Red got about as much out of the frame as did Black, who had the last-shot.

THE ANSWER to the problem shown in Figure 298 of Part 145 is that Amy Close played a front-and-rear double against E on the 8-10 cross-line to make 18 points gain for the shot.

PART 147: TACTICS, SELECTION (L)

A situation that occurs from time to time is one in which the opponent has a disk G in the 10-area, Figure 303, while the shooter has a disk C-1 on the center line beyond the 8-10 line. This type of situation may have arisen when the opponent has knocked

a disk to C-1 on the center line in making the 10.

WHAT HAPPENS. The shooter usually wants to score for a 10 against the enemy disk G, to knock G away or onto the center line, and perhaps to knock

C-1 into scoring area.

Very slight differences in the angle of hitting G may send it at disk C-1 at different angles, and may leave G or C-1 on a line, or cause G or C-1 to score or to leave the court, in a number of

variations and with much uncertainty as to what will happen.

In the quarterfinals of the Sunshine Skyway Tournament at Mirror Lake, Aug. 30, 1954, Webster Smith, the shooter Red, was playing against Henry Andringa,

the opponent Black. The situation at Red's last-shot was as shown in Figure 303. The score was 36 to -4 in favor of Black.

The shooter could (1) tap G gently onto the center line and score a 10 against it for a gain of 20 points for the shot, and for a score of 7 to 10 to be recorded for the frame. This was a delicate shot, but otherwise not very difficult since G was very close to the cross-line.

Or he could (2) shoot against H for a backstopped score of 7, also spoiling H and trying to put it in the kitchen, for a gain of 14 to 24 points. This would be a suitable play, especially in view of Black's large lead in score.

Or he could (3) play to spoil G and put it in the kitchen, for a gain of 10 to 30 points; a long kitchen shot and not easy.

Another difficult shot would be (4) the combination to knock G against H in order to spoil both. In doing this it would probably be impracticable to backstop against G for 10 because of the angle required in hitting G toward H. The gain would be 17 points by spoiling G and H.

The preceding play might be varied by (5) using kitchen speed so that one or the other of the disks G and H might be put in the kitchen; but the nearness of H to one side of the court would prevent both disks from going into the kitchen. The gain would vary from 10 to 27 points.

Or the shooter could (6) knock G against C-1, as described in the beginning of the article.

Finally he could (7) shoot at G with kitchen speed, expecting to spoil G and probably score a 10, perhaps also to put G in the kitchen or to hit C-1 or H alternatively and make some gain that way.

It is not clear what Smitty attempted, but his shooting disk stopped for a 10 at D, Figure 304, he knocked G away, causing it to glance against C-1 and out of scoring area, and G tapped C-1 into scoring area at C-2 for a 7. Gain for the shot: 27 points. Score for the frame: Black 7, Red 17.

CLOSER AND EASIER. Figure 305 shows a similar shot, which occurred in the 1957 Gateway to the Gulf Tournament. The oppon-




Figure 303

Figure 304

Figure 305

ent was Bob White of Sarasota.

The shot was essentially the same, but easier because the disks were nearer each other and

the shooter Red was able to figure the angles so as to have good chances of success, planning and making the shot as illustrated.

PART 148: TACTICS, SELECTION (M)

Here is another fine shot from the 1957 Times Tournament. The final match was being played between Amy Close of Clearwater and Bess Henderson of Mirror Lake, both among our best shufflers.

Bess had won the first game, and in the middle of the second game the score was about even at: Black 35, Red 33.

The situation was as shown in Figure 306. On the board were two of Bess's black disks, F-1 and H-1, for 15 points. Amy had one disk C-1 on the 7-8 line between the two black disks.

FINE COMBINATION. Amy played a combination shot, as shown in Figure 307. It is not certain how far she foresaw the details, but the triple combination was perfect.

Her shooting disk hit H-1 and stopped against it for an 8 at D. H-1 was driven against C-1, and glanced off it to the right to stop on the center line at H-2. She probably played to hit C-1 to right of center in order to drive it at C-2, but she may not have expected that H-2 would stop on a line.

C-1 was driven onward to hit

F-1 and stopped against it for a score of 7 at C-2. Finally, F-1 was tapped onward to the kitchen at F-2. Amy probably hoped for this, since her shot was at kitchen speed.

Gain for the shot: 40 points. Score for the half-round: Black -10, Red 15. Resulting score in the game: Black 25, Red 48.

It is interesting to note that in the next two half-rounds of play Amy gained a further 33 points, to make the score 15 to 71, with a commanding lead. She then went on to win that game and the next, and thus to win the tournament.

ANOTHER CHOICE. In the quarterfinals of the 1954 State Gold Medal Tournament, Amy Close, the shooter Black, was playing against Janet Smith, the opponent Red, with the score 47 to 62 against her.

It was the seventh shot of the half-round and the situation was as shown in Figure 308. She had a disk G in the kitchen, while her opponent had three non-scoring disks, A, B and C, lying on lines. Disk G was partly covered by C, while B threatened a double at Red's next turn, which was to be the last-shot of the




Figure 306

Figure 307

Figure 308

half-round.

It was of course urgent for Black to clear her disk G from the kitchen, and she could do this either by a direct shot at G or by the nearly straight combination to knock C against G. However, if Red then accomplished a double with B for a score of 14 or 15, it would win the game

for Red.

Black therefore decided to play the combination to knock B against G, in order to spoil B and prevent the double and also to clear G from the kitchen. This was a more difficult combination shot because of the angle, but she made it.

PART 149: TACTICS, SELECTION (N)

In one of the matches of the 1957 National Tower Doubles Tournament, Carl Spillman and his partner were leading their opponents by a considerable score, about 25 points.

At the first shot, Spillman placed a cross-guard at A. The opponent then played kitchen-bait, but his disk stopped at E, on the 7-8 line.

Carl could then (1) clear E from the board, which he would have done if it had been a scoring disk.

Or he could (2) place a guard at X, as described in Part 80, thus cutting off the opponent from shooting to double against E or from using any material part of the right side of the board.

Or he could (3) shoot for a hidden score at B. This would cause the opponent to shoot to spoil B but it might be possible to maintain it in place to count as a score at the end of the frame.

In shooting to hide at B, Red would risk the opponent's possible play to make a front-and-rear double with E, but he could probably spoil both disks afterward with a single shot.

His choice was to shoot to B.

In this type of situation, such a play would be the choice of most experts.

GUARD OR HIDE. In a tournament game, Henry Badum, three times national open singles champion, had a score of about 60 to his opponent's 40. At the fifth shot of a frame he saw the situation as shown in Figure 310. Only disks A and F were on the board, the latter being in the kitchen.

The shooter could (1) place a guard at about point X, as discussed in Part 26, to prevent the opponent from knocking away the kitchen disk F. This should insure cutting the opponent's score to 30.

Or he could (2) shoot to hide a disk at or near C, beyond the guard disk A, for the purpose of raising his own score to 67 or 68, that is, within one disk's score of game.

An advantage of this shot is that the opponent would be unable to drive the hidden scoring disk C against the kitchen disk F in a combination to spoil both. And while such a combination shot is successful against a guard X placed at about six feet from the kitchen disk in only about one




Figure 309

Figure 310

Figure 311

time in three, it is impossible against the hidden disk at C.

And with the score as it stood in this situation, it would be especially advantageous to advance Red's score nearer to the game score of 75.

Therefore, playing to the score, the shooter hid a disk at C for a 7.

WHAT WOULD YOU DO? In Figure 311 there is shown a situation that developed in the third game of a quarterfinal match of the 1957 Times Tournament between Ted Matthews and Gerald Anderson. Matthews was about to play the last-shot of the frame.

There were several choices. What would you do? An answer is described in Part 150.

PART 150: TACTICS, SELECTION (O)

When a shuffler has made one or more bad shots in a half-round, while the opponent has made good shots, a difficult and perhaps desperate situation may develop. The player is on the spot. He increases the care with which he plans his play, and he aims with much greater attention to insure that his shot will go where he plans.

CAROM, COMBINATION. Such a situation developed in the third game of one of the quarterfinal matches of the 1956 Farnham Fox Doubles Tournament.

The Black team was the redoubtable Clearwater combination of Amy Close and Fred Galitz. Members of the Red team had never won a place, and they felt they were doing well to stay in the tournament so long.

The Blacks had a commanding lead in the third and deciding game, with the score at: Black 72, Red 40.

The shooter Red had been trying to put black disks in the kitchen in order to cut down the Black lead, but with some bad shooting by Red, coupled with fine shooting by Fred, he faced the situation shown in Figure 312.

Black had three 7s on the board at E, F and G, partly protected by the red non-scoring disk A, while Red had the honor of sitting in the kitchen with a disk at C.

Red was about to play the seventh shot, with Black's last-shot to follow.

With the three black scoring disks on the board, the game was surely lost unless all three of them were spoiled, or at least one spoiled and one kitched. The situation was desperate, and strong measures were necessary.

Red thought he could spoil all three black disks if he could hit disk F at a suitable angle to drive it in a combination against




Figure 312

Figure 313

Figure 314

E to spoil both disks, at the same time glancing to the right in a carom to hit and spoil G.

He figured the angles carefully. The shooting disk was aimed about two inches to the right of